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THE HUNGARIAN POSTAL SECTOR
This paper summarizes recent developments on the Hungarian postal markets and the 
manner, in which they are regulated. In the first part of this study, I describe the evo-
lution and main features of the relevant Hungarian regulations. In the second section, 
I outline the process of market opening and the emergence of market competition, 
including key Hungarian legal cases concerning anti-competitive market conduct. In 
the third section, I assess the economic performance of the Hungarian postal sector 
and its various segments, examining changes in prices over time and price regula-
tions in a separate section. Finally I provide a summary of service quality indicators.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSTAL REGULATIONS IN HUNGARY
Reform of Hungary’s postal regulations began in the early ’90s, drawing on the 
postal regulations of the European Union as they developed. Following institution-
al separation of postal, telecommunications and broadcasting services in 1990, 
separate legislation was introduced for the three sectors from 1992 to 1993. Act 
XLV of 1992 on Postal Services replaced the earlier Act II of 1964. The 1992 Act 
indicated, to a certain extent, the intention of opening the hitherto entirely mo-
nopolized postal markets and allowing other players to be present, subject to pos-
session of the relevant license. The conditions set down in law did not enable ac-
tual market entry.
The concept of the convergence of the information and communications markets, 
which gained ground in the ‘90s, also impacted on Hungarian legislation: the need 
for common framework regulations for these sectors arose as part of the commu-
nications modernization program that got under way in the late ’90s. Accordingly, 
Act XL of 2001 on Communications set the framework regulations for various infor-
mation and communications activities. When regulating postal services under the 
Communications Act, the first EU postal services directive, namely Directive 97/67/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, was taken into account, with 
the result that the fundamental principles of provision of universal postal services 
and market opening were adopted. The 2001 Act opened up those market segments 
involving non-universal services to new entrants. The impact was reflected in the 
increase in the number of market players – 18 registered service providers were 
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present in these market segments in 2002 (the first year of the Communications 
Act), with that number rising to 43 in 2003.
However, the delegation of the European Commission that assessed implementa-
tion of the first postal services directive, criticized several aspects of the Hungarian 
Act on the grounds that it extended the privileges of the universal service provider. 
Criticisms were made in two important respects: first, regarding extension of the 
scope of reserved services (to include cash transfers and payment intermediary ser-
vices) contrary to the directive, and, second, regarding contributions to the subsidy 
fund for universal postal services. In the meantime the second EU postal services 
directive (Directive 2002/39/EC) was adopted, with the result that there was both an 
internal and external need for reform of the Hungarian legislation. However, while 
preparing the amendment to the Act, it became increasingly clear that it was not 
expedient to set out the regulations in a joint law owing to the unique character-
istics of the telecommunications and postal sectors. For that reason, these sectors 
were again regulated separately. Act CI of 2003 on Postal Services and Act C of 2003 
on Electronic Communications were passed. The new Postal Services Act, which 
drew on the second EU postal services directive, was adopted, and within a short 
time the key government decrees and ministry decrees supplementing the Postal 
Services Act came into force.
As the regulations evolved, the scope of universal services was defined with 
increasing precision based on the directives. Although the 1992 Act used different 
terms (namely basic postal services and basic provision of services), it introduced 
numerous elements of universal services (for example, mail not weighing more 
than 2 kilograms and money orders). The provision of universal postal services 
as defined in the 2001 Communications Act was obliged to provide countrywide 
services with respect to domestic packages not weighing more than 10 kilograms, 
postal payment services and financial services, and the following extra services: 
registered mail, delivery with return receipt and insured mail. It also introduced 
a number of quality indicators.
The 2003 Postal Services Act extended the scope of universal services to in-
clude packages weighing up to 20 kilograms and set new, more exacting quality 
requirements. In addition, with respect to the manner of providing postal services, 
the obligations tied to universal services were defined with increasing precision. 
That manifested itself, for example, in provisions concerning household delivery to 
addresses beyond municipal boundaries. The Communications Act and the 2003 
Postal Services Act also regulated access to universal services (minimum opening 
hours of permanent postal service points and minimum times that mobile services 
and mobile post offices are required to spend at the designated access points). These 
two Acts, unlike the 1992 Act, no longer allowed the universal service provider to 
not even attempt delivery of mail weighing over a specified amount to addresses 
outside municipal boundaries.
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The 2003 Postal Services Act defined universal and reserved services as follows:
Scope of universal postal services:
 • postal services involving domestic and international letters, addressed advertising 
mail and forms not weighing more than two kilograms;
 • postal services involving domestic and international packages not weighing more 
than 20 kilograms;
 • postal services involving domestic and international mail not weighing more than 
seven kilograms and containing Braille;
 • extra services (registered mail, delivery with return receipt and insured mail) that can 
be ordered by the person posting the mail to supplement the services defined above.
Reserved postal services within the scope of universal services:
 • services involving domestic or international letters or addressed advertising mail 
not weighing over 50 grams if the price of the service is less than two and a half 
times (earlier three and a half times) the price of a letter in the first weight category 
of the fastest service category of the universal services segment,
 • postal services involving official documents, unless otherwise regulated by law or 
government decree.
With respect to market competition, another important question is how market 
entry is regulated in the various segments. The earlier postal services directive set 
out the possibility for the various Member States to apply a licensing procedure to 
non-reserved universal services, recommending two forms of licensing: the more 
liberal general license and the more stringent individual license. The practices of 
the Member States with regard to licensing can be categorized into four groups. In 
increasing order of stringency and difficulty of entry, these groups are as follows: 
a) no license is required; b) a general license is required; c) an individual license is 
required only for letter mail in the non-reserved universal segment or a limited scope 
of such letters; d) an individual license is required for all universal postal services 
(including packages). Hungary was among the countries in the last group, i.e. those 
countries that apply the strictest licensing procedures. The earlier 2003 Postal Ser-
vices Act classified postal activities into three groups regarding entry requirements.
1. Non-universal postal services (express mail, courier mail, integrated mail and 
document exchange) can be performed subject to registration (which is a straight-
forward process, requiring only a formal declaration of intent).
2. Non-reserved universal postal services can be performed subject to an individual 
license (licensed service providers are not only entitled, but are also obliged to 
perform the universal service for the mail types and geographical area, to which 
the license applies).
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3. The universal postal service provider (Magyar Posta Zrt. (Hungarian Post)), which 
has the exclusive right to provide reserved postal services, was designated by the Act.
To what extent the requirement for an individual license represents a barrier to 
entry also depends on the related conditions and obligations prescribed by the 
regulations and the national regulatory authority. One indicator of the extent, to 
which the requirement restricts entry may be the number of service providers pres-
ent in the various universal postal service sectors. Even among the countries in the 
last group listed (countries where universal postal services can only be performed 
subject to an individual license) significant differences can be observed. (While 
for example, in 2005 more than 200 service providers operated in certain universal 
service segments in Italy, where an individual license is also widely prescribed, in 
Hungary there was not a single service provider aside from the designated univer-
sal service provider.)
Hungary was granted a moratorium until December 31, 2012 to transpose the 
third postal services directive into domestic law and to fully open its postal markets 
to competition. Following protracted negotiations and drafting, Parliament adopt-
ed the new Postal Services Act in fall 2012 (Act CLIX of 2012 on Postal Services) 
virtually at the last moment. The government decrees and ministry decrees for 
implementation of the Act then came into force in December 2012 (Government 
Decree no. 335/2012 (XII. 4.), Government Decree no. 336/2012. (XII. 4.), National 
Development Ministry Decree no. 67/2012. (XII. 15.).
The most important change in the new legislative environment was that almost 
all services were removed from the scope of reserved services, thereby opening up 
the hitherto monopolized postal service segments to competition. The only field, 
in which the universal postal service provider retains the exclusive right to provide 
postal services is the official documents segment.
The new Postal Services Act distinguishes between three types of postal services:
1. Universal postal services:
a) non-registered domestic or international mail (differing from the mail defined 
in b)–d)) not weighing more than two kilograms;
b) domestic or international packages not weighing more than 20 kilograms;
c) domestic or international mail containing Braille;
d) official documents.
However, only services provided pursuant to the general terms and conditions 
constitute universal services. If the universal postal service provider provides the 
service according to terms and conditions set out in an individual agreement that 
differ from the terms and conditions for the universal postal service, according 
to an individually set price, then the service qualifies as a service replacing a uni-
versal service (hereinafter: replacement universal service).
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2. Any postal service involving any mail type qualifies as a replacement universal 
service that does not come under the scope of the services specified in Section 
8 of the Act (services that do not replace universal services; see the summarized 
group of the services in the section below) and is not provided by the postal 
service provider under its universal postal service obligation. In other words, re-
placement universal services are postal services involving all mail in the universal 
category if they are not provided by the universal service provider, or if they are 
provided by the universal service provider, but not under the general terms and 
conditions applicable to the universal service.
3. The below postal services that provide added value compared to universal postal ser-
vices or replacement universal services constitute postal services that do not replace 
universal postal services (hereinafter: non-replacement universal postal services).
a) courier service,
b) express mail service,
c) international EMS service
d) mail service including at least one of the below supplementary services that 
represent considerable added value:
 • mail tracking,
 • service with delivery time guarantee,
 • cash-on-delivery service,
 • service whereby the mail is delivered at a time individually agreed with the 
recipient after the postal service provider has taken receipt of the mail,
 • delivery solely to the person designated as the recipient,
 • other supplementary services connected to mail delivery that are tailored 
to the needs of the sender and are provided on the basis of an individual 
agreement, provided they do not come under the scope of supplementary 
services that must be offered in connection with the universal postal service, 
and whose use means that from the perspective of the user the given service 
no longer qualifies as a replacement universal postal service.
Non-replacement universal services may be performed by any business organiza-
tion based on registration (services subject to registration). By contrast, a license 
is required for performance of replacement universal services (services subject 
to a license). Only the universal service provider may provide universal servic-
es. The Act designates Magyar Posta Zrt. as the universal service provider until 
December 31, 2020.
The Act prescribes that the prices of universal services should be cost-based, but 
only the pricing of individually posted domestic letters not weighing more than 50 
grams and domestic services involving official documents is regulated. The meth-
od for regulating these prices is set out in National Development Ministry Decree 
no. 67/2012. (XII. 15.). In place of the earlier regulatory prices, price cap regu-
lations were introduced (which will be discussed later under “prices over time”).
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The new Act creates the possibility for a Subsidy Fund for Universal Postal Servic-
es to finance the undue additional burden posed by the universal service obligation. 
Payments to and from that account are governed by a separate government decree 
(Government Decree no. 336/2012. (XII. 4.). All service providers, including the 
universal service provider that provides replacement universal services is obliged 
to make contributions to the subsidy fund from their revenue from replacement 
universal services. This contribution is payable according to market share on the 
relevant market (replacement universal services), according to the formula set out in 
the government decree. However, each postal service provider is not obliged to pay 
more than 10 percent of its net revenue from replacement universal services. The 
level of the contribution is determined by a formula set out in the decree according 
to the undue additional burden posed by the universal service. The amount of the 
undue additional burden is established by the National Media and Infocommuni-
cations Authority.
The Hungarian postal sector regulator
In Hungary state service provision and regulatory activities were separated in 1989. 
It was at that time that the separate, state-owned Hungarian Telecommunications 
Company, the Hungarian Broadcasting Company and the Hungarian Post Company 
were established. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Transport, Communications and 
Water Management assumed the role of regulatory authority. In 1993, based on the 
authorization of the Telecommunications Act (Act LXXII of 1992), a combined 
communications authority was created: an independent central authority (commu-
nications authority) operating under the control and supervision of the Transport, 
Communications and Water Management Minister, for the performance of postal, 
telecommunications and frequency management authority tasks. Its central body 
was the Communications Inspectorate General and its local bodies were the regional 
communications inspectorates. As successor to the Communications Inspectorate 
General the Communications Inspectorate was established by Government Decree 
248/2001. (XII. 18), pursuant to which it became a central public administration 
body with legal personality and nationwide competence, operating under the con-
trol of the government and the supervision of the Minister in Charge of the Prime 
Minister’s Office. In January 2004 the National Communications Authority (NHH) 
was established as legal successor to the Communications Inspectorate pursuant to 
the Act on Electronic Communications, and was vested with significantly greater 
powers than its predecessor (as it was granted regulatory, market-shaping and, un-
der certain circumstances, legislative powers by the law).
The current regulatory authority, the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority (NMHH) was established on August 11, 2010 by Parliament with Act 
LXXXII of 2010 on the amendment of certain laws governing media and commu-
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nications. The NMHH was created by merging the National Radio and Television 
Authority (ORTT), which regulated the media, and the National Communications 
Authority (NHH), which regulated the communications sector.
The NMHH is a central budgetary body with independent financial manage-
ment; it covers the costs of its operation from its own revenues. It is tasked with 
promoting the smooth, effective operation and development of the communications 
markets: it protects the interests of those performing communications activities 
and of communications users and it strives to ensure the development and main-
tenance of fair and effective competition and oversees legal compliance of entities 
performing communications activities. However, the independence of the NMHH 
is reduced by certain provisions of the new Act: 1) the head of the authority may 
be appointed by and removed from office by the prime minister, 2) the duties and 
powers of the regulatory authority may be prescribed not only by law, but also by 
government decree. Moreover, the new Act states that the NMHH is involved in 
the implementation of the government’s communications policy.
Market structure and market size
In terms of competition, the Hungarian postal sector can be broken down into three 
categories up to the time of total market opening:
 • absence of competition (because it was prohibited): reserved universal services: 
segment involving letters weighing below 50 grams,
 • minimal competition: non-reserved universal services (until 2009 Magyar Posta 
did not have a competitor; in 2009 a competitor emerged with a small market 
share),
 • strong competition: non-universal postal services, for which the service provider 
needs to be registered (courier services, express mail services, integrated postal 
services, postal intermediary activities, document exchange services).
International experiences show that, in addition to general reduction of reserved 
services, competition was primarily boosted by fully liberalizing segments of the ad-
dressed mail market (eliminating the reserved scope determined by weight limits in 
those segments), in which competitors were rapidly capable of offering competitive 
services. For example, the opening of the outbound international mail segment, the 
total liberalization of addressed advertising mail (e.g. in the Netherlands) or liber-
alization of the market involving (otherwise reserved) postal services that are sup-
plemented by services with added value (e.g. in Germany the “D-license” or hybrid 
mail in Bulgaria). In Hungary’s case, these market segments (within the prescribed 
weight limits) were classed among reserved services until the prescribed deadline 
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for total market opening. The Hungarian regulations have consistently made full 
use of any flexibility allowed by the effective postal services directives to make the 
scope of reserved services as broad as possible. Throughout, Hungary has been in 
the group of countries that have made the least advances in terms of market opening.
In the case of non-reserved universal postal services, the earlier postal services 
Act (Act CI of 2003 on Postal Services) tied provision of such services to obligations 
that acted as a barrier to entry for a long time. As mentioned above, the provision of 
universal services was subject to a license in Hungary pursuant to the earlier Postal 
Services Act. Licensed service providers were not only entitled, but also obliged to 
provide universal services in the geographical region and for the mail types, to which 
the license applied. A license could be requested for provision of non-reserved uni-
versal postal services in one of the following public administrative regions:
 • one or more settlements, with the exception of towns or cities;
 • at least one county with the exception of Pest County;
 • Pest County and at least one county;
 • Budapest and – with the exception of Pest County – a combination of at least two 
counties;
 • countrywide.
The obligations entailed by the license prevented potential market entrants from 
picking and choosing the more profitable market segments within universal services. 
However, they also hindered the development of competition in the non-reserved 
universal services segments. It was not until 2009 that a competitor emerged in those 
market segments, namely Feibra Kft. (a subsidiary of Österreichische Post (Austrian 
Post)). Feibra Kft. commenced operations in 1990, and for a long time focused on the 
unaddressed advertising mail market. In 2008, following a merger with Cont Média, 
it became the largest market player on the unaddressed advertising mail market, 
with a market share of 60 percent. Having established the necessary infrastructure, 
it entered the market for mail weighing more than 50 grams, which is classified as 
a universal service, in 2009. No reliable data are available with respect to the market 
share it achieved in that universal mail segment, but it is highly probably that, in 
line with the experiences of other countries with a liberalized postal market, it did 
not capture a significant share of Magyar Posta’s market.
Following the complete market opening, in January 2013 Feibra Kft. submitted an 
application to provide replacement universal services (for which a license is required). 
However, the outcome of the authority assessment indicates that even the new Postal 
Services Act failed to lessen the entry barriers resulting from the regulations. Feibra 
Kft. was not granted a license by the regulatory authority for the postal sector (the 
authority established that the company’s accounting procedures were not sufficiently 
transparent). Another applicant came on the scene in 2015. City Mail Hungary Kft. 
314 Károly Miklós Kiss
submitted a license application to the authority to perform replacement universal 
services in Hungary, in addition to the postal services it was providing on the basis 
of registration. The NMHH also rejected that license application on the grounds that 
the necessary conditions for reliable delivery performance of the service provider in 
the whole public administrative area of Budapest and material conditions for pro-
viding the service were not in place. As a result, no competitor managed to enter 
the most recently opened market segments within the scope of universal services.
The anti-competitive tax conditions also act as a barrier to entry. Despite much 
criticism of the EU system of exemption from VAT, it is still the case that only a few 
Member States apply an equal level of VAT to the universal service provider and the 
other service providers on the market. In most countries either all activities of the 
universal service provider or its services involving mail that comes under the scope 
of universal services are exempted from VAT or receive a VAT discount, which sig-
nificantly distorts competition. In Hungary, like in most Member States, universal 
postal services are exempt from VAT (on the grounds that they are in the public 
interest) 1, while replacement services are not, with the result that Magyar Posta’s 
competitors are at a significant competitive disadvantage in those segments. In order 
for entrants to the universal services segment to make their services attractive (for 
instance, to the financial sector or public sector, which cannot reclaim VAT), they 
have to offer their services at below the universal service provider’s prices, less the 
VAT amount, which significantly distorts price competition. That limits the range 
of potential customers, and thereby the commercial opportunities of competitors.
There is, however, fierce competition in the field of non-universal postal servic-
es. Table 1 shows steady growth in the number of service providers in the various 
service categories (although the number of deleted service providers also rose 
sharply in 2009, the year following the financial crisis). Since 2010 the number of 
 1 Section 85 (1) of Act CXXVII of 2007 on Value Added Tax.
TABLE 1 • Number of non-universal postal service providers by service category
(based on service categories designated at the time of registration, number of service providers)
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2015*
Total number of registered service providers in the various  
non-universal service categories
96 111 137 178 237 265 179
Deleted in the respective year 8 24 49 66 92 36 n/a
Other courier services 54 75 88 114 139 150 94
Only express mail 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Integrated 0 10 13 12 12 15 10
Combined (courier, express, integrated, and intermediary services) 44 24 30 45 76 100 69
Postal intermediary services 0 2 6 7 10 20 2
 * Data as of July 1, 2015 from the NMHH’s searchable database.
Source: Data provided by the NMHH.
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registered service providers has declined; according to the searchable database of 
the NMHH there were 179 postal service providers providing non-universal ser-
vices at the start of July 2015.
Magyar Posta’s main competitors in the non-universal packages segment and the 
express mail and courier segments are the large international integrator companies, 
namely DHL, TNT, FedEx, UPS, GLS, and Road Parcel Logistics. In those market 
segments, the role of international service providers has continuously grown, with 
Magyar Posta’s market share falling from almost 30 percent in 2002 to around 15 per-
cent in 2007. In 2007, the CR5 index indicating market concentration (the combined 
market share of the five companies with the largest market shares) in these segments 
was 75 percent (ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 60.). In addition to the large international ser-
vice providers, there are also several small enterprises, which chiefly provide local 
courier and express mail services. In these competitive segments, Magyar Posta’s 
market share (based on revenue) in 2006 was as follows in the various segments: 82 
percent in the express mail segment, 1.5 percent in the courier segment (Magyar 
Posta is not present in the integrated mail services segment). (Ecorys [2008] p. 56)
Magyar Posta met with a considerable challenge in the newspaper distribution 
segment in 2007. At the end of 2006, three large newspaper publishers (Ringier, 
Népszabadság and Sanoma) and the Fiege Group established a new newspaper 
distribution enterprise called Médialog Fiege Zrt., which set up an independent 
distribution network in Budapest and another 104 towns and cities. As a result, on 
the newspaper distribution market, Magyar Posta had to scale down its activities 
to smaller settlements not affected by Médialog.
Figure 1 below shows the weighting of the various market segments in 2010. The 
market segments with actual competition accounted for approx. a quarter of the total 
postal industry in 2006. That figure increased to 32 percent in 2008, and was at rough-
ly the same level in 2010 (33 percent). Between 2006 and 2008, revenue in the universal 
services segment grew to a lesser extent than that of the competitive segments, so the 
weighting of the competitive segment within the total revenue of the postal sector in-
creased. However, between 2008 and 2010 the service providers in the competitive seg-
Source: NMHH.
FIGURE 1 • Breakdown of postal revenues by service type in 2010 (based on revenue)
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ment were hit harder by the effects of the financial and economic crisis than the univer-
sal service provider (which held a monopoly or near monopoly in many of its markets).
Table 2 shows the volume of mail handled by the various competitive segments. 
We can see from the mail volume data that integrated postal services are the largest 
market segment within non-universal postal services, as is also shown by the rev-
enue data set out in Table 4. Of the competitive segments, the combined revenue 
of the service providers is by far the greatest in this market segment (integrated 
mail services: HUF 37,585 billion, courier services: HUF 3,560 billion, express mail 
services HUF 1,411 billion).
From Table 3 we can see that the number of letters handled by Magyar Posta 
unlike packages), contrary to international trends, has not yet fallen significantly 
(although, despite the minor fluctuations, a slight downward trend can be observed). 
In the case of packages, the decline can be attributed to the fact that some of the mail 
volume has shifted to services with greater added value (e.g. express mail services, 
courier services and integrated mail services). The majority of letters even in 2010 
were in the reserved (i.e. monopolized) segment involving mail weighing below 50 
grams (94 percent of letters and 73 percent of addressed advertising mail).
TABLE 2 • Breakdown of mail in the competitive segments, 2010
  Courier Express Integrated Total
Domestic delivery 1,944,761 493,448 17,371,463 19,809,672
Posted abroad/inbound 0 79,725 2,229,808 2,309,533
Outbound international 0 31,913 1,544,715 1,576,628
Forwarded by another service provider 0 9,683 49,834 59,517
Forwarded to another service provider 1,921 36,329 34,123 72,373
Undelivered 148 17 33,677 33,842
Total 1,946,830 651,115 21,263,620  
Source: NMHH.
TABLE 3 • Volume of domestic mail in the universal services category over time, 2005–2010
(number of mail items)
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Standard letters 546,581,962 577,675,535 625,071,170 644,007,359 611,849,821 625,983,883
Registered 91,653,008 89,626,214 80,382,591 78,370,999 75,954,598 71,557,794
Value-declared letters 328,715 465,036 351,082 312,881 325,161 305,105
Official documents 38,307,238 39,640,710 43,774,374 45,799,263 46,712,382 50,398,334
Addressed advertising mail 75,490,746 89,579,418 31,721,887 27,788,101 27,509,099 26,930,883
Forms 13,138,625 10,330,540 5,766,055 3,338,148 5,031,472 2,314,206
Packages 4,559,849 2,673,383 1,760,958 1,541,523 1,443,324 1,379,066
Of the above: insured 1,881,753 1,033,462 1,178,690 1,303,731 252,201 200,743
Universal mail 770,060,143 809,990,836 788,828,117 801,158,274 768,825,857 778,869,271
Source: Data provided by the NMHH.
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From the data in Table 4 we can see that in recent years the net sales revenue 
increased in both the non-competitive universal services segment and in the com-
petitive express mail services and integrated mail services segments, while the ag-
gregate revenue from courier services decreased significantly between 2008 and 
2010. If we examine the development of these market segments by looking at the 
volume of mail, we can see that during the three years the mail volume of the uni-
versal service provider showed a negative tendency, with some fluctuations, while 
the growth rate of the mail volume in the competitive segments was typically greater 
than the revenue increase in those same segments.
Payment services and financial intermediary activities play a highly significant 
role at Magyar Posta. If we look at Magyar Posta’s 2011 Annual Report (Magyar 
Posta [2011]), we can see that revenue from payment services and financial inter-
mediary services accounted for approx. 32 percent of its total revenue (Table 5).
TABLE 4 • Net sales revenue, broken down by market segment (HUF millions)
Segment 2006 2008 2010
Percentage change 
(2006–2008)
Percentage change 
(2008–2010)
Universal service 74,000 85,001 95,346 +14.87 +12.17
Courier service 2,455 7,237 3,560 +194.79 –50.81
Express mail service 1,484 349 1,411 –76.48 +304.30
Integrated mail service 22,406 31,227 37,585 +39.37 +20.36
Source: NMHH and Magyar Posta [2006], [2008], [2010].
TABLE 5 • Revenue of Magyar Posta over time, 2009–2011
Services
2009 2010 2011
HUF millions % HUF millions % HUF millions %
Letter mail services 83,977 48.8 85,311 49.6 85,786 49.0
Newspaper services 6,173 3.6 5,489 3.2 5,364 3.1
Logistics services 7 ,497 4.4 7,608 4.4 8,549 4.9
Postal finance services 46,133 26.8 45,989 26.8 46,942 26.8
Banking and investment services 7,487 4.3 7,635 4.4 7,509 4.3
Insurance services 1,198 0.7 1,360 0.8 1,730 1.0
Retail and postal outlet activity 7,540 4.4 6,460 3.8 6,868 3.9
International services 12,038 7.0 12,058 7.0 12,432 7.1
Total revenue 172,043 100.0 171,910 100.0 175,180 100.0
Source: Magyar Posta [2011] p. 14.
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Competition authority and regulatory authority proceedings
The proceedings of the regulatory authorities can be divided into three main cate-
gories. The cases in the first group are typical of the earlier period of regulation of 
the postal markets and resulted from the particular features of those regulations, 
namely cases concerning interpretation of the boundaries of the reserved scope of 
services. Since the universal service provider was granted exclusive rights to provide 
services in certain sectors, the exact boundaries of those sectors were a key ques-
tion in terms of competition. It was naturally in the interest of the universal service 
providers for the reserved segment to be as broad as possible.
The second category of proceedings involves cases investigating conduct that 
restricts competition. Such cases involve abuse by universal service providers of their 
market strength (discriminative price discounts, cross financing that distorts com-
petition, pricing that drives out competitors, and problems concerning accessibility). 
The earlier system of reserved services meant that there were exclusive rights in 
certain market segments. As a result, one purpose of the regulations was to prevent 
cross financing between services provided in a monopoly and services provided 
under competitive conditions in the case of economic players with exclusive rights. 
As the proportion of competitive markets has increased, the regulator also needs 
to examine whether companies extend their established dominant position on one 
reserved market to their activities in liberalized segments, or whether they abuse 
their monopoly by discriminating between the various consumer categories. Since 
the market strength of the incumbent national postal companies had not declined 
significantly after the market opening in the previously reserved segments, such 
regulatory cases remained important following the total market opening.
The third main group of competition authority proceedings involves merger 
inspections resulting from the international expansion of the large universal postal 
service providers. This last group does not differ from competition authority pro-
ceedings in other industries,2 so I will not discuss it in detail, and will instead provide 
a summary of cases in the first two groups.
Proceedings concerning anti-competitive market conduct were launched against 
Magyar Posta in 2005. The NHH conducted an investigation into the discount system 
of the designated universal postal service provider. The authority chiefly investigated 
whether the pricing and discount system applied by Magyar Posta Zrt. to its contrac-
tual customers as per its key partnership agreements, and to other major consumers, 
were in line with the provisions of the Postal Services Act on the pricing of postal ser-
vices and application of such prices, and whether the requirement for non-discrimi-
natory treatment was met with respect to Magyar Posta’s contractual partners. The 
Authority ruled that several aspects of the key partnership agreements gave cause for 
 2 A summary of such cases can be found in the paper of Geradin and Henry [2004].
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concern and ordered Magyar Posta to review its discount system and to develop a set 
of contractual conditions in line with the principles set out in the ruling and to render 
its active contracts legally compliant (ruling no. PS-19.710-4/2005 – NHH [2006]).
With respect to that same period, the Competition Authority also examined 
whether Magyar Posta had abused its dominant position (Vj-174/2005/55). In co-
operation with the NHH, it examined in relation to Magyar Posta’s discount system 
whether the conclusion of certain exclusive agreements had led to closure of the 
market. The Competition Authority terminated the proceedings since it established 
that Magyar Posta had only concluded an exclusivity agreement with Magyar Tel-
ekom Rt. and that Magyar Telekom Rt.’ s share of the letter mail market was less 
than 10 percent. The Competition Council therefore concluded that the agreement 
did not lend itself to preventing competitors from entering the market or creating 
a disadvantageous market situation for such competitors (i.e. closure of the market).
The Competition Authority earlier examined whether Magyar Posta’s discount 
system constituted abuse of its dominant position on the grounds that the discount 
system led to the bundling of products in a way that restricts competition. The 2011 
proceedings (Vj-167/2001/52) focused on Magyar Posta’s practice of giving greater 
than usual discounts to those customers that also had the delivered mail (typically 
invoices) produced by Magyar Posta. The investigation, although it was launched 
in relation to a specific order (Émasz public procurement), identified objectionable 
discounts in contracts between 1999 and 2001. According to the ruling, Magyar 
Posta used its dominant position on the basic postal services market to restrict and 
distort competition on the mail delivery market, which can be termed competitive. 
Thanks to the special discount it offered, it persuaded customers to commission it 
with mail production too. The Competition Authority fined Magyar Posta HUF 20 
million and ordered it to desist from the practice in question.
It is also worth mentioning two other Hungarian legal cases concerning the an-
ti-competitive conduct of Magyar Posta. The Competition Authority’s Competition 
Council launched proceedings against Magyar Lapterjesztő Zrt. and Magyar Posta 
Zrt. on the grounds that they had concluded an agreement restricting competition, 
and established that their conduct had restricted competition in its ruling of No-
vember 8, 2007. Pursuant to an earlier agreement in effect between 1998 and 2001 
in connection with the privatization of Magyar Posta’s newspaper distribution com-
panies, Magyar Posta would not compete for the delivery of newspapers from the 
printing presses to retailers. In exchange, Magyar Posta managed to have the com-
mission paid by Lapker for newspapers sold in Magyar Posta’s post offices increased 
from 13 to 23.5 percent in the cooperation agreement concluded between the two 
companies for the period between 2002 and 2007. In the amendment of the agree-
ment effective from January 2003, the newspaper distributor agreed not to engage 
in subscription-based newspaper distribution, which was considered to be Magyar 
Posta’s domain. In connection with the non-compete agreement, Magyar Posta re-
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ceived one-off market organization fee of HUF 260 millionfor not impeding Lapker’s 
business for another five years. The Competition Council ordered Magyar Posta Zrt. 
and Lapker to pay a fine of HUF 468 million each. The appellate ruling of April 22, 
2009 reduced that amount to HUF 250 million each (ruling no. Vj-140/2006/69).3
The other case worth mentioning involves postal services, but does not concern 
the letter and package markets. On November 8, 2007, the Competition Authority 
launched proceedings against Magyar Posta on the grounds of abuse of its dominant 
economic position. According to the investigation, Magyar Posta applied terms and 
conditions to the authorization or conclusion of contracts concerning the produc-
tion of cash transfer orders that were liable to distort competition on the related 
market for the production of forms (on which Magyar Posta is itself present) or in 
certain segments of that market. The Competition Council, based on the evidence 
available, found that on at least five occasions between 2004 and 2007 Magyar Posta 
declined to authorize the production of forms required for cash transfer orders. In 
one case it had technical reasons for declining, but in the other cases its decision 
was based on commercial considerations. However, it was established during the 
proceedings that several enterprises are present on the market for production of the 
forms required for cash transfer orders, and that those market players are significant 
competitors of Magyar Posta, so, in the period examined, Magyar Posta’s conduct 
would not have jeopardized competition on the market for production of forms for 
cash transfer orders or on other markets, and damage to consumers was also not 
considered likely. By its ruling of July 8, 2008, the Competition Council therefore 
terminated its competition supervision proceedings (ruling no. Vj-186/2007/36).4
MARKET PERFORMANCE
Economic performance
According to the estimates of the international study carried out by the ITA-WIK 
group, in Hungary the letter mail segment accounted for 59 percent of the mail 
volume of the postal industry in 2007 (with an estimated market value of EUR 405 
million), while activities involving packages and express mail accounted for 41 per-
cent (estimated market value of EUR 280 million) (ITA–WIK [2009b] pp. 59–60). 
By comparison, letters accounted for 56 percent of the EUR 94 billion revenue of 
the total EU mail sector in 2007, while packages and express mail accounted for 
44 percent (ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 25). In general, the packages and express mail 
segment is growing more dynamically than the letter mail segment. Total internal 
 3 http://www.gazdasagkifeheritese.uni-corvinus.hu/images/8/8b/GVH_-_lapterjesztokartell.pdf.
 4 http://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/2008-09-18-Hungary03Doc_82_.pdf.
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EU letter mail grew in the past 10 years by 0.4 percent on average, while package 
and express services rose by 6.1 percent on average (ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 36 and p. 
140). First, that reflects the stimulating effect of competition, which developed far 
sooner internationally on those last two markets. Second, the fact that new forms 
of electronic communication are gaining ground primarily poses a challenge to the 
letter mail segment, since such information can be conveyed by other methods with 
new communications technology solutions. That is less true of package and express 
mail services involving tangible, physical mail.
Of course considerable deviation of the various Member States lies behind the 
EU averages. We can see from Table 6 that the growth rate was considerably lower 
in the Western European Member States, which have more mature postal markets, 
than in the Southern and in particular Eastern Member States. The data, however, 
show that despite the more marked growth rate, the letter mail markets of the latter 
country groups are still significantly “less developed” (in the sense of saturation/
maturity of the market): the number of letters per capita is significantly below the 
Western European average. Table 6 shows that in Hungary the volume of mail per 
capita is below the EU average (and considerably lower than that of the Western 
Member States, which have more mature postal markets), but higher than that of 
the Eastern Member States that have joined the EU more recently. Understandably, 
the growth rate was lowest in the period between 2003 and 2007 in those Member 
States with a mature (and therefore largely saturated) postal market.
The negative Hungarian growth rate is somewhat misleading, however. If we 
look in more detail at the underlying data (Table 7), we can see that of the growth 
rates of the three separate groups of addressed domestic letters (numbers in italics), 
newspaper distribution is the only segment with a negative growth rate. That, how-
ever, is highly distorted, since for that segment the data only reflect the mail volume 
handled by Magyar Posta, which decreased considerably in 2007 as described above, 
owing to the arrival of a new competitor. The conclusion cannot be drawn from the 
data that the total volume of mail actually decreased to that extent on the newspaper 
distribution market. Further, the data concerning addressed advertising mail do not 
give an accurate impression of that segment, since Magyar Posta’s classification of 
mail has since changed; in 2007 some mail types were reclassified from the earlier 
addressed advertising mail segment into the unaddressed advertising mail segment. 
If we eliminate all those distortions from the growth data of the cited international 
study, then the growth of the Hungarian letter mail market (dominated by the 0.7 
percent growth rate of letters), would be around the modest EU growth average, 
below the 2.2 percent growth of the Eastern Member States, but, as we can see from 
Table 6, with a greater number of mail items per capita.
With respect to packages and express mail, the Hungarian 18.5 percent growth 
rate shown in Table 6 is in line with the average growth trend of the Eastern Euro-
pean Member States.
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The vast majority of mail is sent by companies and public organizations. Eighty-
eight percent of the total volume of letters in the EU is sent by such market players 
(B2X) and just 12 percent by private individuals (C2X) (including micro enterprises 
and sole traders). Of the letters posted by businesses, 35 percent are addressed to 
other businesses (B2B), while 65 percent are addressed to private customers (B2C). 
Unfortunately data of such depth are not available for Hungary, but the proportion 
of letters posted by businesses is estimated to be around 95 percent, i.e. higher than 
the EU average (correspondence by private individuals has steadily declined since 
2004). (ITA–WIK [2009b] p. 60)
In Table 8 more detailed data for the last three years have been compiled showing 
the performance of the postal sector and of the universal service provider.
TABLE 6 • Domestic letter mail within the EU–27, 2007
Member States
Number of mail items  
per capita*
Compound annual growth rate, 
2003–2007 (percentage)
Share of revenues from mail 
within the EU (percentage)
Letters
Western Member States 297 0.2 81.4
Southern Member States 94 1.1 14.5
Eastern Member States 68 2.2 4.1
Hungary 98 –1.5 –
Packages and express mail
Western Member States – 5.4 75.1
Southern Member States – 9.3 21.7
Eastern Member States – 18.8 3.2
Hungary – 18.5 –
Western Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom, Finland, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Sweden; Southern Member States: Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Eastern Member States: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia.
*  Weighted average (weighted by population).
Source: based on ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 38, p. 143 and ITA–WIK [2009b] pp. 59–60.
TABLE 7 • Size and growth of the Hungarian letter mail market
Market segment
Items per capita,  
2007
Compound annual growth rate,  
2002–2007 (percentage)
Domestic letter post 98 –1.5
 Letters 90 0.7
 Addressed advertising mail 3 20.6
 Newspaper distribution 5 –23.1
 Unaddressed advertising mail 70 15.5
Outbound international mail 2 –1.3
Note: Data on the segments publications, unaddressed advertising, and cross-border outbound generally refer to incumbent 
postal operator / universal service provider.
Source: ITA–WIK [2009b] p. 59.
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TABLE 8 • Data showing the economic performance of the Hungarian postal sector  
and the universal postal service provider (2006–2008)
Designation 2006 2007 2008
Percentage change
2006–2007 2007–2008
Net sales revenue (HUF millions)
Universal servicea 74,000 79,465 85,001 +7.37 +6.98
Courier service 2,455 3,281 7,237 +33.65 +120.57
Express mail service 1,484 1,865 349 +25.67 –81.29
Integrated mail service 22,406 26,066 31,227 +16.33 +19.80
Number of mail itemsb (in thousands)
Universal service 809,990.8 788,828.1 801,158.2 –2.61 +1.56
Courier service 1,192.1 1,789.6 2,599.5 +51.42 +45.26
Express mail service 411.0 501.5 483.6 +22.02 –3.57
Integrated mail service 8,167.9 10,072.8 13,133.7 +23.32 +30.39
Number of employees
In the postal sector 39,706 37,648 n/a –5.18 –
Universal service providerc 38,686 36,429 35,973 –5.83 –1.25
Productivityd
Postal sector revenue (HUF million/employee) 2.53 2.94 n/a +16.21 –
Number of mail items handled by the postal sector  
(in thousands/employee)
20.65 21.28 n/a +3.05 –
Revenue of universal service provider  
(HUF millions/employee)
1.91 2.18 2.37 +14.13 +8.72
Number of mail items handled by the universal 
service provider (in thousands/employee)
20.93 21.65 22.27 +3.44 +2.86
Investment (at current prices, in HUF billions)
Postal sector total 18.30 16.20 n/a –11.47
Postal sector, proportional to revenuee 0.18 0.15 –16.67
Universal service provider, totalf 13.63 11.29 7.97 –17.17 –29.41
Universal service provider, proportional to revenue f 0.18 0.14 0.09 –22.22 –35.71
a Magyar Posta [2006], [2007], [2008].
b Number of mail items with domestic delivery.
c Magyar Posta [2006], [2007], [2008].
d The productivity of the industry measured in output per employee and productivity of the incumbent service provider measured 
in output per employee (calculated on the basis of the other data in the table)
e Investment per forint of revenue (investment/sales revenue)
f Magyar Posta [2006], [2007], [2008].
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, the data are taken from the communications statistics database of the National Communications 
Authority (NHH).
We can see from the data in Table 8 that the net sales revenue increased in both 
the non-competitive universal services segment and in the competitive market 
segments (courier, express and integrated mail services) in the period shown, but 
the competitive segments showed much stronger growth. If we examine the devel-
opment of these market segments by looking at mail volume, we can see that in the 
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case of universal services the volume of mail tended to fall, with some fluctuations, 
while the growth rate of the mail volume in the competitive segments was typically 
greater than the revenue increase in those same segments.
The output per employee was calculated as a measure of productivity, meas-
uring output in revenue or volume of mail. The indicator calculated on the basis 
of the number of mail items is not suitable for the comparison of various industry 
segments (or for the comparison of the industry average and the universal service 
provider), because the mail types are very different in the various segments (Magyar 
Posta handles a significantly higher proportion of letters than its competitors, which 
chiefly operate in the packages and express mail segments). However, it can serve as 
a more useful indicator of development over time within the given market segment 
than the productivity indicator, which is calculated on the basis of revenue, since 
the latter can change as result of price increases, i.e. it does not necessarily reflect 
an actual change in efficiency. We can see that distinction, for instance, in the case 
of the indicators of the universal service provider, since the increase in mail volume 
per employee (3.44 and 2.86 percent in the periods of 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 
respectively) was considerably more modest in the period examined than the reve-
nue increase per employee (14.13 and 8.72 percent in the same periods respectively). 
The income per employee, however, is worth comparing directly for the various 
market segments. We can see from these data that the productivity of the sector as 
a whole was greater in that period than that of the universal service provider (the 
productivity of the sector as a whole was HUF 2.53 million/employee and HUF 
2.94 million/employee in 2006 and 2007 respectively, while the productivity of the 
universal service provider was HUF 1.91 million/employee and HUF 2.19 million/
employee) in 2006 and 2007 respectively).5
If we examine investments over time, we can see that there is not a considerable 
difference in investments proportional to revenue (investment per forint of revenue) 
of the sector as a whole and of the universal service provider. From the last rows of 
Table 8 it can, however, be seen that in recent years the investments of the universal 
service provider decreased to a greater extent (by 17.17 percent between 2006 and 
2007) than the investments of the sector as a whole (by 11.47 percent). Moreover, 
the investments of the universal service provider decreased even more sharply in 
the following year (by 29.41 percent between 2007 and 2008).
 5 Caution is advised when drawing conclusions since the number of employees refers to the entire 
workforce (those whose duties only include mail services do not constitute a separate group), 
while the revenues are from mail services only. In the case of Magyar Posta, the proportion of 
other, non-mail activities is greater (for example, in 2008 financial activities accounted for approx. 
31.5 percent of Magyar Posta’s revenue – Magyar Posta [2008] p. 13) than at its competitors, so 
the proportion of employees performing non-postal tasks within the total workforce is likely 
higher.
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PRICING REGULATIONS AND PRICES OVER TIME
In most Member States price regulations refer to universal services as a whole, but in 
some countries they only apply to those universal services segments where there is 
no discernible competition. In Hungary until the complete market opening, only the 
prices of reserved services were regulated despite the fact that for a long time Magyar 
Posta did not have any competitors in the non-reserved universal services segment, 
so the universal service provider’s prices in that segment were not restricted by either 
market competition or regulations. In Hungary, until the end of 2012 (until the time 
of total market opening), prices were regulated ex ante by ministry decree (by decree 
of the Ministry of National Development, and earlier by decree of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Transport and of the Ministry of Informatics and Communications).
Price cap regulations came into force in Hungary too following the complete market 
opening. As of January 2013, National Development Decree no. 67/202 (XII.15.) sets 
out the method for determining the postal fees for individually posted domestic let-
ters not weighing more than 50 grams that come under the scope of universal services 
(quantity and price in the respective year qti and pti, quantity and price in the preceding 
year pt – 1i) and of official documents (quantity and price in the respective year qti and 
pti, quantity and price in the preceding year pt – 1i). The price cap has to be specified 
per mail type, and the growth rate in the respective years is tied to the consumer in-
dex. If the latest forecast of the Hungarian National Bank (RPIt – 1MNB) indicates a rise 
in the consumer price index, the postal service provider is entitled to increase the 
price, and obliged to decrease it if a decrease in the consumer price index is forecast.
Given the possible inaccuracy of the forecast, the deviation from the actual 
change in prices (data published by the Hungarian Statistical Office: RPIt – 1KSH) 
needs to be taken into account when prices are changed in the following year as 
an inflation correction factor (Zt = RPIt – 1MNB – RPIt – 1KSH). If the service provider 
is loss-making despite providing services effectively, then it is exempt from the 
obligation to reduce prices and does not need to apply the inflation correction rate 
(the loss needs to be demonstrated to the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority). The percentage value of price changes of the respective year for mail 
of the postal service provider that comes under this category can be calculated as 
follows (using a Paasche-type price index):6
 6 The Paasche-, Fisher- or Törnquist-type indexes can also be used for ex post regulations. The Törn-
quist index is widespread in telecommunications, whereas in the postal industry the Paasche index 
is frequently used, despite the fact that the Paasche indexes do not have Fisher-type properties 
and do not stand the time test (for there to be a multiplicative inverse relationship between the 
indexes calculated by inverting the time periods) or the factor test (i.e. the price index multiplied 
by the volume index does not give the value index).
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Should the service provider fail to calculate the price change level in that man-
ner, then an authority correction factor (Xt = ΔVt – 2 – ΔPt – 2) may be applied. That 
authority correction factor is reflected in the maximum extent of the annual aver-
age price change of services to which regulated prices apply: Pt = RPItMNB – Zt – Xt.
We can only directly examine price changes of those mail segments with regulated 
prices, since information for Hungary is only available for those segments. We can 
draw cautious conclusions about the other segments only by comparing the mail 
volume data and revenue data. In most Member States price regulations refer only 
to universal services, but in some countries they only extend to those segments of 
universal services where there is no perceptible competition. In Hungary until the 
complete market opening only the prices of reserved services were regulated, despite 
the fact that for a long time Magyar Posta did not have any competitors in the non-re-
served universal services segment, so the universal service provider’s prices in that 
segment were not restricted by either market competition or regulations. As men-
tioned earlier, it was not until 2009 that a competitor entered the non-reserved market 
segments involving addressed letters (primarily advertising mail) weighing more than 
50 grams. From the data set out in Tables 3–5 above, we can attempt to draw cautious 
conclusions about prices over time in the various market segments. If we compare 
the growth rate of revenue and the volume of mail, we can see that in the non-com-
petitive universal services segment, the overall volume of mail declined slightly in 
recent years (by almost 3 percent from 2008 to 2010), while revenue increased (by 12 
percent). The difference between the two indicates an increase in prices exceeding 
inflation in this market segment. By contrast, in the competitive segments the vol-
ume of mail increased to a greater degree than the resulting revenue, which suggests 
that prices did not increase significantly in those segments (we have to be cautious, 
however, when drawing conclusions, since we do not have information at our disposal 
concerning changes in the breakdown of mail types in the various price categories, so 
we cannot filter out the effect of changes to the proportions of the various mail types).
Table 9 shows regulated prices over time in the reserved segments. From the 
data it can be seen that prices increased for every mail type. The greatest price in-
crease (for both letters and addressed advertising mail) was in the most frequent 
(non-priority standard) category (85 percent from 2007 to 2014 for letters and ad-
dressed advertising mail).
We can see therefore that in recent years the prices for letters weighing less than 
50 grams, which are regulated, increased to a greater extent than inflation, in par-
ticular from 2011 to 2012, when the increase in price for letters and advertising were 
between 12.5 percent and 16.66 percent. We can also see from the data in the table, 
however, after the total market opening, which coincided with the introduction of 
price cap regulations, the increase in prices slowed. While in the previous years the 
increase in prices was considerably higher than the inflation rate; in 2013 and 2014 
it only slightly exceeded inflation. The slowing down of the price increase is due to 
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the stricter price cap regulations, rather than the total market opening directly, since 
new competitors did not manage to enter the universal services segment.
The figures below summarize price changes in the letter mail segment and the 
addressed advertising mail segment.
The prices of letters increased continuously (Figure 2). In the case of addressed 
advertising mail (Figure 3) following a minor decline in 2008 (there was no change 
in the most frequent category (non-priority standard) and a slight decline in the 
other categories), in 2009 prices went up again. In total, the combined price in-
crease of those three years was at the same level as the price increase in the letter 
mail segment.
Source: Table 9.
FIGURE 3 • Regulated prices for postage of addressed advertising mail  
and official documents over time
Source: Table 9.
FIGURE 2 • Regulated prices for postage of letters (letters, plain postcards,  
illustrated postcards) over time
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If we wish to assess the performance of the Hungarian postal sector and the reg-
ulations in terms of price changes, then it is worth comparing the prices of services 
with the data from other countries. For international comparisons, the price of 20 
gram letters is a frequently used measure since the majority of mail is in that cate-
gory. The prices of postal services differ considerably among European countries. 
Figure 4 shows that the prices for 20 gram letters ranged between EUR 0.23 and 
EUR 0.8 in 2009 (adjusted for purchasing power). If the prices are simply converted 
to EUR and compared, then the Hungarian prices would seem relatively high (in 
the top third of the EU Member States). If, however, we compare the prices after 
adjusting for purchasing power, then the Hungarian prices were not high in 2009 
and were below the EU average, despite the fact that the prices of services increased 
fairly significantly in Hungary between 2005 and 2009. A greater price increase than 
in Hungary was only experienced in four countries during that period (Figure 5).
Source: Copenhagen Economics [2010] p. 39.
FIGURE 5 • Annual growth rate of nominal prices for 20 gram tariff letters, 2005–2009
Source: Copenhagen Economics [2010] p. 37.
FIGURE 4 • Prices in EUR for 20 gram letters in 2009, PPS-adjusted
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Service quality
With respect to universal services, the Hungarian Postal Services Act (similarly to the 
postal services directive), not only defines the scope of service obligations, but also 
contains provisions concerning regional accessibility and opening times, and quality 
requirements pertaining to those services. Below I will give a summary of the perfor-
mance of the Hungarian universal postal service provider in light of those indicators.
Accessibility of services7 • In 2010 no interruptions in the operation of postal service 
points, delivery districts or collection services were experienced. Services were pro-
vided in compliance with the legal requirements, and there was full household de-
livery in compliance with the law in all (3,154) settlements. Magyar Posta complied 
with the requirements for opening times (referring both to the times when mobile 
post offices are present and to the opening hours of permanent postal service points).
Compliance with the provisions concerning geographical accessibility in 2010 
was as follows:
 • Universal postal services were not available in three of the 1,250 settlements with 
a population of fewer than 600 residents.
 • Three settlements with between 600 and 1,000 residents did not have the pre-
scribed permanent postal service point.
 • Currently 1,037 settlements only have a mobile post office, in addition to which 
services are provided by means of a combination of a mobile post office and a per-
manent service point in 85 settlements. An access point was designated and a post-
box was installed in each of those settlements that only have a mobile post office.
 • Of the 1,394 settlements with a population of greater than 1,000 residents, avail-
ability was not in compliance with the law in one case.
Act CI of 2003 also prescribed that when establishing and operating postal access 
points, it needs to be ensured that those using the services (including persons living 
with disabilities) can easily access the postal network without barriers.
 • 1,743 of the 2,740 permanent postal service points did not comply with the legal 
requirements, despite the fact that the relevant grace period expired in 2007;
 • 74 of the 8,988 postboxes available to the public did not comply with the statutory 
requirements;
 • 17 of the 3,890 designated delivery/collection boxes outside municipality bound-
aries did not comply with the requirements for barrier-free access;
 • the designated access points could be accessed barrier free in 1,036 of the settle-
ments that only have a mobile post office; that was not possible in 70 settlements.
 7 Based on data provided by the NMHH.
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Service quality indicators • In 2010 Magyar Posta’s operations complied with all 
the quality indicators prescribed by law. There has been improvement in respect 
of almost all delivery time indicators in recent years. The indicators for reliability 
of mail forwarding showed either no change or a slight worsening, but the service 
provider’s performance was well above the statutory requirements regardless. These 
quality indicators are summarized in Table 10.
TABLE 10 • Postal service quality indicators, 2008–2010*
Type of quality indicator
Number of 
business  
days
Statutory 
requirement  
(%)
Performance 
(national average, %)
2008 2010
Delivery time: speed and reliability indicators
Delivery time for priority letters D + 1
D + 3
85
97
92.69
99.73
93.68
99.76
Delivery time for non-priority letters D + 3
D + 5
85
97
95.07
99.39
95.59
99.58
Delivery time for packages D + 1
D + 3
85
97
92.89
99.73
92.27
99.89
Quality requirements for the date stamp
Proportion of mail with an illegible date stamp ≤ 0.15 0.0017 0.0005
Requirements for reliability of mail forwarding
Proportion of totally or partially lost registered domestic mail ≤ 0.06 0.0338 0.0338
Proportion of damaged registered domestic mail ≤ 0.05 0.0038 0.0080
 * The specific quality requirements were established as a percentage of mail items arriving with a given number of business days 
following the day of being posted (D), i.e. the percentage of mail items that need to arrive by the given day. For each category 
there is a so-called speed indicator (D + 1 for priority letters and packages, D + 3 for other mail) and a reliability indicator (D + 3 
for priority letters and packages, and D + 5 for other mail).
Source: NHH [2009] and the NMHH.
SUMMARY
Reform of the regulations of the Hungarian postal sector began in the early ‘90s. 
The postal, telecommunications and broadcasting services were had been previously 
combined into a single company with a state monopoly, and it was not until 1990 
that the three fields were split into three separate companies. These fields were 
then also regulated separately by law. The Postal Services Act of 1992 opened up 
certain segments of the postal market (using current terms, certain non-universal 
segments) to competitors. Nevertheless, there were no actual market entrants owing 
to the strict conditions set out in the legal regulations. The Communications Act of 
2001, which combined regulation of the information and communications markets, 
created an actual market opening in the field of non-universal services. After the 
Communications Act came into force, the number of registered service providers 
in the courier and express mail segments rapidly multiplied. The regulations set 
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out in the Communications Act concerning the postal sector were intended to be 
in line with the first EU postal services directive (Directive 97/67/ EC). However, 
the Act was strongly criticized by the European Commission in its examination of 
Member State implementation of the postal services directive on the grounds that 
the privileges of the universal service provider had been extended (primarily with 
reference to extension of the scope of reserved services to cash transfers, payment 
intermediary services and postal order services contrary to the directive).
As there was both internal and external need to amend the legislation, a new Act 
on postal services was adopted in 2003, in which the regulation of the postal sector 
was again separated from the telecommunications and other communications ser-
vices. The second postal services directive (Directive 2002/39/EC) was taken into 
account when drafting that Act. Hungary was granted a moratorium until December 
31, 2012 for transposition into Hungarian law of the third postal services directive 
and total market opening. Owing to the lengthy negotiating and drafting procedures, 
at almost the last minute, in fall 2012, Parliament adopted the new Postal Services 
Act, which almost entirely eliminated reserved services. The only field, in which the 
universal postal service provider retains the exclusive right to provide postal services, 
is the official documents segment. Hungary consistently sought to define both uni-
versal services and reserved services as broadly as possibly (to the extent allowed by 
the EU directives), and prescribed conditions for entry to the opened universal ser-
vices segments that barely allow for the emergence of new competitors. Hungary was 
in the last group of EU Member States with respect to the extent of market opening.
The anti-competitive tax conditions also act as a barrier to entry. In Hungary, 
similarly to most Member States, universal postal services (in view of being in the 
public interest) are exempt from VAT, while replacement universal services are not, 
with the result that Magyar Posta’s competitors in those segments are at a consid-
erable competitive disadvantage. In order for entrants to the universal services 
segment to make their services attractive (for instance, to the financial sector or 
public sector, which cannot reclaim VAT), they have to offer their services at below 
the universal service provider’s prices less the VAT amount, which significantly 
distorts price competition.
In terms of competition, the Hungarian postal sector can be broken down into 
three categories up to the time of total market opening:
 • absence of competition (because it was prohibited): reserved universal services: 
segment involving letters weighing below 50 grams,
 • minimal competition: non-reserved universal services (until 2009 Magyar Posta did 
not have a competitor; in 2009 a competitor emerged with a small market share),
 • strong competition: non-universal postal services, for which the service provider 
needs to be registered (courier services, express mail services, integrated mail 
services, postal intermediary services, document exchange services).
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Nor did the picture change after total market opening, since competitors have 
not managed to enter the most recently opened reserved services segment (mail 
weighing less than 50 grams) since then. The two entry applications were rejected 
by the regulatory authority on the grounds that they did not fulfill the statutory 
requirements. There is, however, fierce competition in the field of non-universal 
postal services. In the non-universal packages segment and the express and courier 
segments. Magyar Posta’s main competitors are the large international integrator 
companies. In addition to the large international service providers, there are also sev-
eral small enterprises, which chiefly provide local courier and express mail services.
Based on revenue, the competitive segments account for just over a third of the 
total Hungarian postal sector, and the mail volume of the competitive segments 
grew faster in the last ten years than that of universal services. As a result, the total 
revenue of the competitive sectors as a proportion of the total industry revenue is 
increasing slightly from year to year. Integrated mail services are the largest market 
segment (26 percent in 2010) within competitive, non-universal postal services. 
Contrary to international trends, the number of letters handled by Magyar Posta 
(unlike packages) has not yet fallen significantly (though a slight negative trend can 
be observed despite minor fluctuations). The majority of letters sent in 2010 were 
in the reserved (i.e. monopolized) segment of mail weighing less than 50 grams: 94 
percent of letters and 73 percent of advertising mail (in which Magyar Posta does not 
currently have a competitor). Payment services and financial intermediary services 
continue to play a major role within Magyar Posta’s activities (accounting for roughly 
a third of its total revenue). The performance data from the period examined here 
show that the productivity of the total sector including the competitive segments 
was greater than the productivity of the universal service provider (measured in 
revenue per employee).
In Hungary until the complete market opening only the prices of reserved servic-
es were regulated, despite the fact that for a long time Magyar Posta did not have any 
competitors in the non-reserved universal services segment, so the universal service 
provider’s prices in that segment were not restricted by either market competition 
or regulations. Until the end of 2012, prices were set by the relevant authority ex 
ante – the regulated prices of reserved services were stipulated by ministry decree. 
Price cap regulations came into force in Hungary too, following the complete mar-
ket opening. Within universal services, the price cap regulations apply to the prices 
of individually posted domestic letters not weighing more than 50 grams and to 
official documents. The regulated prices have increased every year in the past ten 
years for every type of mail. The greatest price increase (with respect to both letters 
and addressed advertising mail) was in the most frequent (non-priority standard) 
category (by a total of 85 percent from 2007 to 2014 with respect to letters and 
addressed advertising mail). The increase in prices slowed following the complete 
market opening, which coincided with the introduction of price cap regulations. 
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While in the previous years the increase in prices was considerably higher than 
the inflation rate, in 2013 and 2014 it only slightly exceeded inflation. The slowing 
down of the price increase is due to the stricter price cap regulations, rather than 
the total market opening directly, since new competitors have not managed to enter 
the majority of the universal services segment.
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